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1THE CULT OF MARTYRS
ABSTRACT. 
This paper suggests a rational explanation for extreme voluntary sacrifice in situations 
in which the state of the world when the decision must be made is observable only by the 
agent. Such explanation is the cult of martyrs, heroes, and saints. This cult may get out of 
control and fuel fanaticism, or excessive sacrifice from the standpoint of the sponsoring 
organization.  A survey of the historical evidence of Christian martyrdom strongly suggests 
that martyrs were driven by the expectation of a cult in this world, not by otherworldly 
rewards. In particular, it is argued that the evidence of excess martyrdom in both Muslim 
Spain and the Roman Empire strongly speaks for the cult theory.
21. Introduction
Economists have recently tried to come to grips with the difficult problem of finding a 
rational explanation for martyrdom, or the voluntary sacrifice of one’s life ostensibly made 
for the purpose of serving the common good, however understood. The main contributions to 
this literature include Azam (2005), Ferrero (2006), Harrison (2006), Wintrobe (2006). 
Though widely different, all these approaches share the feature that no reliance is placed on 
the expectation of reward in the hereafter, which makes the models applicable to both 
religious and secular martyrs – a valuable feature since both types abound, and sometimes 
shade into one another, in the real world. On the other hand, all the mentioned approaches 
also share one limitation: the need or usefulness of the life sacrifice in a given circumstance 
is public information, so that each model concentrates on conditions for individual 
participation and suggests a device that makes the contract enforceable, or the commitment 
self-enforcing. Relatedly, in such a setup, the demand for martyrs is not analyzed, or is 
implicitly assumed to be unlimited: the organization knows what it wants and when it wants it 
done, its only problem is to motivate people to do the job. 
While the assumption of full information is often adequate, this is not always the case: 
the long, varied history of martyrdom from ancient times to the present is replete with 
examples in which the specific occasion for martyrdom is observable only by the individual 
or group on the spot, not by the organization which sponsors them. Furthermore, the 
mismatch between need and deed, or demand and supply of particular actions, can occur both 
ways: sacrifice may not be forthcoming when the organization would welcome it if it only 
knew the relevant circumstances, and conversely, suicidal action may be undertaken that 
ultimately harms the organization. In other words, perhaps surprisingly, even for an 
organization that sponsors self-sacrifice there may be too much of a good thing, as the classic 
instances of both early Judaism and early Christianity clearly exemplify. If that is the case, 
then clearly the problem must lie with the incentives.
This paper works within the framework set forth in Ferrero (2006) and develops it to 
account for unobservable martyrdom situations and the possibility of excessive, as well as 
insufficient, supply of martyrs. It retains the basic idea that there is a probability, not 
certainty, of death, which makes expected utility theory applicable, and which places 
martyrdom on a continuum of contracts that can encompass military heroism, political 
insurgency, civilian self-immolation, and other high-risk operations. The only conceptual 
3innovation the paper makes with respect to received utility theory is the assumption that 
(some) people care about the way they will be remembered after death: even though their 
preferences may give no weight to life in the next world, altruism toward family or 
community, or within-group solidarity as such, they value the survival of their good deeds in 
the collective memory of those who will have witnessed their sacrifice. The device that 
ensures this is the cult of martyrs, or of heroes, that the organization, or “society” itself, will 
keep alive. This key assumption does not seem outlandish – arguably less so than regard for 
the common good of future generations (as in Azam, 2005), trading life for identity (as in 
Harrison, 2006, building on Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), or switching the leader’s preferences 
for one’s own (as in Wintrobe, 2006). On reflection, most people value some kind of earthly 
survival beyond death: most ordinary people through their offspring, Ludwig van Beethoven 
or Leonardo Da Vinci through their immortal art, and some people through becoming the 
object of the survivors’ cult. These people will naturally tend to be young, unmarried, and not 
especially gifted, which accords well with the observed demographic characteristics of 
martyrs around the world. Finally, since the cult need not be reserved to those who died in 
action but can be, and often is, extended to those who died peacefully after an exemplary life 
of sacrifice, the model naturally lends itself to an explanation of saints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets forth a 
simple hidden-information, principal-agent model of the cult. Section 3 engages in a selective 
review of historical evidence that broadly supports features of the model, while section 4 is 
devoted to an extended discussion of Christian martyrdom in search of support for the cult 
model as against the hereafter hypothesis. The last section draws some policy implications 
and conclusions. 
2. A simple model
The full-information model set forth in Ferrero (2006) envisages a two-period contract 
between an organization and an individual. This “martyrdom contract” offers members certain 
benefits in the first period and probabilistic benefits in the second period, when the 
individual’s sacrifice of life may be called for, in which case if he complies his benefits are 
zero. If his martyrdom is called for but he reneges on his contract, he incurs a social sanction 
or stigma. Individuals accept the contract if it yields a level of expected utility that is no lower 
than their reservation utility. Members comply and undergo martyrdom, if and when 
4requested to, if the sanction on reneging is sufficiently strong. The contract is thus viable and 
efficient to the extent that the organization is in full control of benefits and sanction. 
However, the sanction provides an adequate enforcement device only if the realization of the 
requirement of martyrdom, and hence the actual occurrence of compliance or reneging, can be 
observed costlessly by all parties. If such realization is private information to the agent, then 
there are no grounds to apply the sanction and deterrence of reneging requires a different 
incentive mechanism. 
To sharpen our focus on essentials, consider a single period when the realization of a 
random state variable, θ, occurs, and consequently an action, a, is undertaken by the agent. 
While the organization observes the actual action, the realization of θ is observed only by the 
agent. For simplicity, assume that both variables can take on only one of two values: 
martyrdom (M) and non-martyrdom or normality (N), where the action of martyrdom means 
that one “behaves like a martyr”, i.e. is willing to sacrifice his/her life, though not necessarily 
dying in the process. A situation of martyrdom is one that in the organization’s judgment 
would call for the agent’s sacrifice, if only the organization knew enough about it. A 
martyrdom situation (θ = M) occurs with probability P, known to all parties. Both the 
principal/organization’s returns and the agent’s utility depend on the action conditional on the 
state, in the following way. The organization gains returns r(a, θ) which are higher when the 
action matches the situation, i.e. (a, θ) = (M, M) or (N, N), than when it does not, i.e. (a, θ) = 
(M, N) or (N, M), while it could be r(M, M) ≥< r(N, N). Call the pair (a, θ) = (M, M) 
appropriate martyrdom, the pair (a, θ) = (N, N) appropriate non-martyrdom, the pair (a, θ) = 
(M, N) excess martyrdom or fanaticism, the pair (a, θ) = (N, M) insufficient martyrdom or 
defection; that is, fanatics are those who act like martyrs when the situation does not warrant 
such behavior, while defectors are those who avoid sacrifice when the situation would call for 
it. Therefore, while there is no presumption that appropriate martyrdom should generally be 
better or worse than appropriate non-martyrdom, we assume that the organization’s long-term 
interests are harmed if either excess martyrdom or insufficient martyrdom occur. Thus:
r  M ,M  ,r N ,N r M ,N ,r N ,M                                                     (1)
Turning to the agent, without loss of generality, we assume risk neutrality on the part 
of the agent. People who engage in such activities are not noted for their aversion to risk, and 
risk aversion would only complicate the algebra without yielding any additional insight. As is 
standard in the principal-agent literature, we assume that individuals’ utility is an additively 
5separable function of the benefits provided by the organization for each action, ba, and the 
cost of action, c(a, θ). With a dichotomous structure of both a and θ, we have:
U=ba−c a,θ            with   c M ,θ c N ,θ    for any θ ;  a,θ=M ,N     (2)
For future reference, let us specify a more structured cost schedule:
c M ,N ≥c M ,M c N ,M ≥c N ,N                                                      (3)
The first specification of the cost schedule in (2) is obvious: it simply says that in any 
state of the world, life is preferred to death. The specification in (3), however, which satisfies 
(2) but adds further restrictions on the way cost varies with θ, is not obvious and deserves 
comment. The first part of the inequality says that martyr behavior when the situation calls for 
it (M, M) is less costly to the agent than the same behavior when it is unwarranted (M, N). 
This seems a reasonable assumption but is not a logical necessity: exhibitionists would feel 
otherwise. The second part of the inequality says that non-martyr behavior when this is just 
the right thing (N, N) is less costly than defection in a martyrdom situation (N, M). This too 
seems reasonable, possibly because of the sense of guilt that strikes a defector, but is not a 
logical necessity: “shameless” people would feel otherwise. These two assumptions about the 
cost structure are critical: as we will see, if either assumption fails the optimal contract that 
deters both fanatics and renegades may not exist. 
With two types of action we have two values of the benefits, bM and bN. While the 
latter are the ordinary benefits that accrue to group members as a reward for normal behavior, 
bM is special. If the martyr’s action results in death, as will often be the case, these benefits 
consist in his anticipation, at the time of action, of the cult that will keep his name and deeds 
alive, praised and loved through time. This is the “special” assumption about preferences 
discussed in the introduction.
As a benchmark, let us first examine the full-information situation. If the organization 
observes the realization of θ, it can direct members’ behavior as appropriate and write down 
the corresponding rewards in the contract. Given a member’s reservation utility U°, the 
organization maximizes its expected net returns subject to the participation constraint:
6max
b M ,bN
P [r  M ,M −bM ]1−P  [r N ,N −bN ]
s.t.      P [bM−c M ,M ]1−P  [bN−c N ,N ]≥U
0                                      (4)
Clearly the participation constraint will be binding in the optimal contract. Hence, 
because of risk neutrality, any pair (bM, bN) that satisfies the constraint as a strict equality will 
be equivalent in the optimal solution – including bM = 0.
We now turn to our central concern, when the realization of the state θ is unobservable 
by the organization. Now the appropriate behavior in each state cannot be specified ex-ante in 
the contract. Rather, appropriate incentives must be given to make it in the agent’s interest to 




P [r  M ,M −bM ]1−P  [r N ,N −bN ]
s.t.    iP [bM−c M ,M ]1−P [bN−c N ,N ]≥U
0    participation
        iibM−c M ,M ≥bN−c N ,M                             no defectors
        iiibN−c N ,N ≥bM−c M ,N                              no fanatics
         (5)
The participation constraint (i) is now supplemented by two incentive-compatibility, 
or truth-telling, constraints. Inequality (ii) says that when a martyrdom state obtains, behaving 
as a martyr yields utility no lower than defecting does; similarly, inequality (iii) says that 
when a normal situation obtains, the utility from normal behavior is no lower than the utility 
from martyr behavior, or fanaticism. Note that unlike the PC, the ICs are independent of 
probabilities: once a state θ is realized, what could happen in a different state does not matter.
Using cost schedule (2), constraints (ii) and (iii) yield:
0c M ,M −c N ,M ≤bM−bN≤c M ,N −c N ,N                                     (6)
If the reward structure satisfies this inequality, the organization will always get what it 
wants
1 and achieve a first-best outcome as under full information. Also, in the optimal 
1 It may be the case that implementing the contract (5) proves to be too costly for the 
organization, which would then be better off by giving up on the pursuit of martyrdom 
entirely. This can be checked by comparing net benefits under (5), with constraint (i) binding, 
to net benefits when the action requested of the agent is always N and correspondingly bM = 
7contract the PC (i) will again bind
2 while the ICs may or may not bind and consequently, 
condition (6) may or may not be satisfied as strict equalities. As in the full information case, it 
is still the case that a range of (bM, bN) pairs of values is compatible with the optimal contract, 
but now this range is sharply narrowed: bM must now be strictly greater than bN and therefore, 
if bN is taken to be nonnegative, it must be strictly positive. Thus while a cult of martyrs is 
possible but not necessary under full information, it is strictly necessary for a hidden-
information contract to work.
Further insight into what incentive condition (6) implies for the working of this 
martyrdom contract can be gained by looking at the more structured cost schedule (3). If the 
latter holds with strict inequalities, there is a broad margin to accommodate the efficient (bM – 
bN) value; but if the schedule holds with strict equalities throughout (which implies that c(.) is 
invariant to θ) then both ICs bind and there is a unique (bM – bN) value that satisfies condition 
(6): the optimal contract still exists but is more “brittle”. Furthermore, if the inequalities in 
either the first part or the second part of the cost schedule (3), or in both, are reversed, then 
there is no assurance that condition (6) can be satisfied. Specifically, if there are exhibitionists 
who prefer to be martyred when the organization would not want them to, reversing the first 
part of inequality (3) (c(M, M) > c(M, N)), it is easy to check that condition (6) may or may 
not hold, depending on how “wrong” they are. Similarly, if there are shameless people who 
prefer not to be martyred when the organization would want them to, reversing the latter part 
of inequality (3) (c(N, N) > c(N, M)), condition (6) may or may not hold depending again on 
how “wrong” they are. Finally, if people are both exhibitionists and shameless so that the 
bN, subject to only the PC and IC (iii) (which then reduces to cost schedule (2)). As one would 
expect, it turns out that contract (5) is optimal for the organization if moving from a = N to a 
= M when θ = M brings about a greater increase in returns than in costs, i.e. r(M, M) – r(N, 
M) > c(M,M) – c(N, M). For the remainder of this paper we assume that this is always the 
case. 
2 This is because the incentive constraint (6) depends only on the difference in benefits, not 
their absolute value. If the agent enjoyed a surplus, benefits level could be lowered while 
keeping their ratio constant until the PC binds. The fact that asymmetric information in this 
model entails no efficiency loss and no transfer to the agent as a rent on his information 
monopoly may seem at variance with standard principal-agent theory. However, it is only a 
consequence of the dichotomous structure of action, which creates a hit-or-miss situation: to 
get a “hit”, i.e. for the contract to succeed, action must be at its first-best value in either state 
of the world.
8entire inequality (3) is reversed, then condition (6) cannot hold and the optimal contract that 
solves problem (5) and simultaneously deters both fanatics and defectors does not exist. When 
for whatever reason condition (6) is not satisfied, the difference in benefits (bM – bN) is either 
low enough to deter fanatics but then everyone will defect, or it is high enough to deter 
defectors but then everyone will commit suicide.
The conclusion is that the incentive contract (5) is fairly robust to alternative 
specifications of individual preferences. It will fail only if the exhibitionists are really wild, or 
if agents really enjoy reneging on their commitment to the organization, or if they totally 
disagree with the organization’s evaluations across the whole range of possibilities. However, 
it should be kept in mind that in the real world actual rewards can be affected by events or 
factors beyond the organization’s reach. If the organization’s control of benefits, and 
particularly of the cult of martyrs, is less than complete, then it is even more likely that either 
defection or fanaticism will be the norm. 
3. Some historical evidence
The single empirical reference for the analysis in Azam (2005), Harrison (2006) and 
Wintrobe (2006) is current Islamic suicide terrorism. Although Ferrero (2006) surveys a 
broader range of cases, most involve tightly directed suicide missions, including the Assassins 
of the medieval Middle East, the Palestinian suicide bombers, the  Iranian pasdaran of the 
1980’s, the Japanese kamikaze, and Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers. All such instances approximate 
fairly well the condition of full information. Although a cult usually exists in those cases too, 
in this section we focus attention on the range of cases in which the agent is virtually alone in 
evaluating the situation and making the decision. The cases span all the range from the 
religious to the secular.
The paragon of the cult of heroes is found in Greek antiquity (see Wikipedia, 2009, 
and the references therein). Starting at least with Homer’s poems, certain fateful characters 
willfully chose fame and honor instead of leisure for the sake of living on in the memory of 
subsequent generations. The early heroes, like Achilles, were mythical but their cult was 
historical, continuing well into Roman times; in time, historical figures again and again 
followed on their steps. If we believe the ancient sources, this shows that extreme sacrifice, to 
varying degrees, can indeed be motivated by the expectation of a cult. It must be noted that 
9this classical prototype is unambiguously secular, since ancient paganism had no conception 
of the afterlife as a reward and punishment system. 
Coming closer to us in time, three groups of cases can be distinguished. The first 
involves the fighting martyrs, even if religiously inspired, and includes the Sikhs of the heroic 
days, the Muslim jihad fighters
3, as well as war heroes of all stripes across history. Here the 
cult of martyrs and heroes has been under the control of an army, or a militarily oriented 
religious organization, and so has proven reliable as an incentive system (Cook, 2005, 2007; 
Fenech, 1997). Due to the completely decentralized organization of the Muslim religion, 
however, a given martyr cult may be functional to the incentives devised by a given Muslim 
group for its members but not to other groups, nor arguably, to the Islamic cause in general. 
The second group involves suffering passive death at the hands of persecutors or 
enduring lifelong sacrifice. Here the cult may escape the control of the sponsoring religion 
and feed on itself, yielding excessive deaths; or, the sacrifice may be endorsed by a splinter 
group that fosters the cult and thrives on it. After the experience of the Jewish zealots in the 
war against the Romans of CE 66-70, rabbinic Judaism tried to restrain martyrdom by 
stringent rules (Shepkaru, 1999). Early Christianity was beset by excessive, unnecessary 
sacrifice of lives, both in the mainline church (discussed in detail in the next section) and in 
several deviant, radical sects such as the Montanists (Klawiter, 1980; Trevett, 1996, pp. 121-
129, 176-184) and the Donatists (Frend, 1971): decentralized cult was too strong (Ferrero, 
2006). Thereafter, in the mainline Western church, a secular shift to centralized canonization 
by the popes occurred, both for martyrs and saints in general, which gradually brought the 
cult under church control – something that makes sense only if the cult itself had been judged 
excessive in the earlier period (Delooz, 1969; Ferrero, 2002). This shift was a controversial 
affair that began in the High Middle Ages and came to a head with the Counter-Reformation. 
As a consequence, the plentiful crop of Catholic martyrs of the early modern era – fallen 
under the Reformation, in the French revolution, or in the overseas missions – had to wait 
between two and three centuries to achieve canonization, clearly lagging behind other saints; 
a clear indication of “political” preferences by the church hierarchy, which began to change 
only after 1850 (Delooz, 1969, pp. 300-310).
3 There seems to have been hardly any instance of passive martyrdom of Muslims under 
persecution after the days of Muhammad, because Islam has ever since been closely identified 
with power. In Islam, martyrdom is sought rather than suffered (Cook, 2005, pp. 34-35; 2007, 
pp. 23-30).
10Finally, the third group involves individual, solitary actions or organized political 
actions. A cult exists and thrives even here, and may be strictly controlled e.g. by the 
communist parties or other revolutionary organizations. For example, “Hero of the Soviet 
Union” was an official title awarded by the Soviet state, bestowing praise and privilege on the 
individual (if surviving the action) and his/her family; 12,745 such titles were awarded in the 
fifty years between the 1930’s and the 1980’s (Wikipedia, 2009). On the other hand, the 
anarchists (Ferrero, 2006) and the agents of self-immolation for a civic cause (Biggs, 2005) 
are not responsive to any well-defined demand and so can perpetuate their lineage without 
bounds.
Consider self-immolation. In his thorough study of the subject, based on an extensive 
dataset from 1963 to 2002, Biggs (2005) notes that despite the fact that religious vocations, 
especially of the Hindu and Buddhist types, are predominant in his sample, evidence of an 
otherworldly motivation is almost entirely absent (pp. 198-199); that “vanity”, i.e. gaining 
notoriety or attention from others, and the desire to make up for past personal failures must be 
substantial factors, though naturally very difficult to trace (pp. 199-200); and that the site and 
date of the event can become focal points of commemoration and celebration for a long time 
afterwards (pp. 203-204). Though he never uses the term, the idea of a cult is not far from his 
characterization. Were it not for the atrocity of the most popular means of death – by fire – 
entry into this cult would be “easy”, compared to entry into the cults of the other groups 
discussed above: the act requires no organization, the person need not have made any prior 
commitment or investment as member of a religious or secular organization in order to 
qualify, and in many cases, though not all, the act generates a tremendous response – a wave 
of imitation – which both ensures that the initiator will be revered and provides incentives for 
others to join in the chain. One could say that by joining a collective cause and volunteering 
for fiery death in that context, an individual gains a (probabilistic) opportunity to secure a 
martyr cult for himself or herself. Since there usually is no sponsoring organization, it is not 
clear that we can ever speak of “excessive” martyrdom; significantly, in a rare case in which 
there was such a sponsoring organization – the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – disavowal 
occurred (Biggs, 2005, p. 192).
4. Christian martyrs: the cult versus the hereafter hypothesis
11As the last section showed, the case of the non-religious martyrs clearly indicates that 
afterlife rewards are not necessary for explaining martyrdom while a cult can provide an 
alternative explanation. Restricting now our attention to the religiously denominated martyrs, 
up to this point this paper has only claimed that the cult hypothesis can be as good as the 
hereafter hypothesis in accounting for martyrs’ behavior. In this section we ask what kind of 
evidence, if any, can be found to discriminate between the two hypotheses. For any evidence 
to speak for the cult theory, it would seem that three conditions must be met: first, there must 
be a real element of choice in the individuals’ behavior – that is, it must be possible for them 
to avoid death without apostatizing; second, the theology must be such that the heavenly 
rewards granted a martyr are equally available for other kinds of virtuous behavior; and third, 
there must be a correlation between differential propensities to become a martyr and some 
observable characteristics or strengths of the cult – often, the presence of “excess” martyrdom 
or fanaticism can be a telling indicator. The second condition disqualifies the Muslim and the 
Sikh martyrs for the purpose of this discussion: the Hadith and the Jihad literature (though not 
the Quran) single out martyrs for special treatment in heaven, where certain rewards, such as 
sexual delights, are uniquely available to them and not to other righteous Muslims (Cook 
2007, pp. 31-33, 37-38); similarly, the Sikh martyrs are granted liberation from the cycle of 
existence and union with God whereas ordinary believers are not (Fenech, 1997).  The Jews’ 
case is too complex to be dealt with here as their theology of the hereafter is itself 
controversial. Therefore this section focuses on Christianity in its Mediterranean and 
European heartlands
4, which offers a rich variety of cult organizations and promises the same 
bliss to all who are granted access to heaven, martyrs or otherwise. 
4.1. Jesus and the early Christian martyrs
The most spectacular example of someone who underwent martyrdom for the sake of 
a cult among the living and not for gaining access to heaven is none other than Jesus of 
Nazareth. This is true whether one looks at the historical figure of Jesus the man or one 
accepts the Christian claim about the divinity of Jesus the Christ. If Jesus was divine, he was 
one of the persons of the Godhead who was incarnated, died and rose again to deliver the 
hope of salvation to all who would accept his gospel and worship him. So we can say that the 
4 Martyrdom in the Christian missions overseas would be a promising extension of this study. 
As one example, the case of the Korean Catholic martyrs of the 19
th century appears similar to 
the ancient Roman case: see Finch (2009).
12purpose of his supreme sacrifice was to found a cult centered around himself as the Son of 
God. If Jesus was a man
5, then he was an apocalyptic Jewish prophet who preached the 
impending coming of the kingdom of God for the redemption of all Israel and then faced his 
execution while promising soon to return in glory to establish the kingdom. He was certainly 
not striving to earn a place in heaven for himself: he thought of himself as God-blessed and 
God-sent, let his followers hail him as Messiah, and looked confidently to his place back on 
the right hand of God. All his followers had to do to earn themselves a place in the upcoming 
kingdom was to believe his promise, remember him, and keep the hope alive – which they 
did. In the event, this particular cult of a martyr survived the waning of apocalyptic hope and 
gave rise to a major world religion. Furthermore, Jesus appears as the archetypal “fanatic” 
martyr in the technical sense used in this paper: the Judaism of his time was filled with 
messianic expectations but never envisioned that the Messiah – a victorious leader and 
redeemer of the people of Israel – should sacrifice himself and die on a cross. 
The two centuries between the early second century and Emperor Constantine’s edict 
of toleration (CE 313) were the age of Christian martyrs in the Roman Empire
6. The Roman 
authorities typically put Christians to the sacrifice test: a largely symbolic acknowledgment of 
the Roman gods as a token of loyalty to the empire, upon which they would be free to 
continue to practice their religion; in other words, unlike the Jews, the Christians were not 
excused from practicing what they saw as idolatry. Large, though unquantifiable, numbers no 
doubt yielded to the persecutors and apostatized, but several thousands died, while another 
untold but large number, for a variety of reasons, were lucky enough to escape execution 
without recanting. 
While the standard account by Christian historians presents the martyrs as dying “for 
the Name of Christ”, ie to witness their faith, there are at lest four reasons to think that the 
pursuit of a cult is a better description of their actions. First, voluntary martyrdoms were 
pervasive: many Christians were not sought out and apprehended but spontaneously offered 
themselves up to the Roman authorities, courting their own death in a way that bordered on 
suicide. Church leaders and theologians were only too aware of this widespread eagerness for 
5 The “quest for the historical Jesus” has given rise to a large and controversial literature. Here 
I follow Sanders (1993) and Fredriksen (1999). 
6 The standard reference is Frend’s (1965) detailed account. However, I found the shorter, 
sharper discussions in de Ste Croix (1963) and Bowersock (1995) particularly illuminating. 
See also the analysis in Ferrero (2006), which accurately deals with defection but touches on 
fanaticism only as a problem for the church hierarchy’ hold on power.
13martyrdom and, from Clement to Origen to Cyprian, relentlessly tried to restrain it. However, 
their message did not get through because the church itself was of two minds: other prominent 
leaders, including the great orator Tertullian in the early third century and later the Donatist 
sect in North Africa, enthusiastically endorsed and supported the voluntary martyrs. Not until 
the end of the fourth century, in the then Christian empire, did the church settle on a 
definitive, unambiguous injunction against suicide, which has persisted as a central Christian 
doctrine down to this day. Second, although voluntary martyrdom was a Christian innovation, 
it was not made up from whole cloth, as it connected to, and drew support from, an influential 
precedent: the well-established, time-honored, Roman pagan tradition of noble suicide, dating 
back to Roman antiquity and re-fuelled by Stoic and Cynic philosophy in imperial times. 
Tertullian was perhaps the most outspoken heir to, and apologist for, this view among the 
Christians. Bowersock (1995, pp. 72-73) writes: “Without the glorification of suicide in the 
Roman tradition, the development of martyrdom in the second and third centuries would have 
been unthinkable. The hordes of voluntary martyrs would never have existed. Both Greek and 
Jewish traditions stood against them. Without Rome, a martys would have remained what he 
had always been, a ‘witness’ and no more”. Third, since persecution always struck in the 
cities and was often localized and unevenly and intermittently enforced, those Christians who 
chose not to be martyred in a persecution had the option of leaving the city, as Jesus himself 
had instructed them to do (Matthew 10: 23) and as the great Cyprian himself did in CE 250 
(Bowersock, 1995, pp. 43, 54). Again, some leaders condemned flight, others did not. Fourth, 
and perhaps most important, martyrdom was an urban phenomenon. Although Roman 
governors routinely toured the provinces to administer justice, the martyrs regularly showed 
up in the big cities or, if imprisoned elsewhere, requested to be transferred there to be tried in 
the central square and executed in public spectacles of blood sport in the city amphiteater 
(Bowersock, 1995, pp. 42 ff), so as to presumably advance the cause of the church with 
maximum impact. They faced up to their ordeal much like the Sophists, who also drew 
crowds of supporters, teaching and preaching lengthy sermons to an intrigued audience. They 
died like gladiators of God, athletes performing in the Graeco-Roman urban space. Later, 
when the soldier-martyrs appeared under Emperor Diocletian’s persecution, the military 
context provided an analogue to the civic one (p. 55). This set of facts strongly speaks for the 
cult theory since no variety of Christian theology of salvation has ever claimed that heavenly 
rewards are denied to those who are interrogated in small towns or executed out of sight. Thus 
as Edward Gibbon remarked, “The assurance of a lasting reputation upon earth, a motive so 
14congenial to the vanity of human nature, often served to animate the courage of the martyrs” 
(quoted in Bowersock, 1995, p. 4). 
4.2. The martyrs of Cordoba
Between 850 and 859 forty-eight Christians were executed by the Muslim government 
of Cordoba on two different charges: most made denigrating remarks about the prophet 
Muhammad in public places, while some were Christians of Muslim parentage who had 
previously kept their faith secret but suddenly revealed themselves in public as apostates. All 
concerned fully knew that both types of action qualified as capital offenses under Islamic law, 
so they deliberately invited execution. They were hailed as martyrs by the group of radical 
Christian contemporaries in Cordoba to which they belonged, but at the same time were 
disparaged as fanatics and troublemakers by many – possibly the majority – of their fellow 
Christians, both clergy and laity. So clearly we have here a case of militant dissent from the 
mainline church and hence a level of martyrdom that is “excessive” from the church’s point of 
view. Following Coope’s (1995) careful study, our task is to ascertain if a martyr cult can 
explain their behavior. 
By the middle of the ninth century relations between Christians and Muslims were 
relatively peaceful and functional in Muslim Spain. As dhimmis (non-Muslim monotheists 
living in an Islamic society), Christians were subject to legal discrimination but otherwise free 
to practice their religion and be governed by their own laws. Many were drawn to the emir’s 
court and held government jobs. Then the martyrs’ movement precipitated a crisis in Muslim-
Christian relations and a bitter split within the Christian community. The government reacted 
harshly to the attacks by arresting clergy, closing monasteries, raising Christians’ taxes, and 
dismissing them from government service – all on the principle that the dhimmi community as 
a whole was accountable if some of its members did not behave. As a result, prominent 
Christians spoke out against the movement, accusing the radicals of bringing down a 
persecution on all Christians where none existed before for “selfish” motives. Such a reaction 
was justified in that the Muslim authorities did not seek the Christians out before the start of 
the crisis. But if so, what were the martyrs’ “selfish” motives? Why did some Christians 
prefer death to life under Muslim rule?
The movement was largely the work of the priest Eulogius, who provided intellectual 
leadership, offered support to the martyrs awaiting execution in prison, chronicled their words 
and deeds in installments to inspire and sustain the next candidates who would follow suit, 
15and finally was himself executed as the last victim of the group. The chief motive he 
attributed to the martyrs was concern about the afterlife; in a parallel fashion, the moderate 
party complained that the fanatics wanted to ensure “their own place in heaven by provoking 
a confrontation with the Muslims, then dying and leaving the rest of the Christian community 
to face the consequences” (Coope, 1995, p. 71). Yet since the Christians were not sought out 
and asked to recant, it is not at all obvious that their salvation was at stake short of joining the 
martyrs’ ranks – and if it were indeed at stake, why was there no martyrs’ movement under 
Muslim rule either before or after the 850’s? Furthermore, at least half of the victims were 
either clergy, or monks and nuns, or people who had spent at least some time in a monastery, 
and many of the others were members of (sometimes religiously mixed) families with ties to 
the monasteries. These people were ascetics and literate in Latin Christian scripture, thus they 
kept aloof from the perceived corruption of the Muslim court and society. So it would seem 
that all such people were already taking extra care of their salvation in the next life.
On the other hand, the charged atmosphere of a close-knit penitential community 
provides a clue to the motivation that triggered the movement: the pursuit and expectation of 
a cult. Coope (1995, p. 72) recognizes just that: “Once someone from a given monastery was 
executed, he or she became an example to other members of the community. Some of the 
extremely ascetic monks and nuns who were martyred were celebrities even before they died. 
(…..) If such people were famous in life, their prestige must have increased dramatically after 
they were martyred (and after Eulogius told their story). Such martyrs inspired other members 
of the community to follow them, out of religious zeal and, perhaps, a desire to share in the 
glory.” At the end of the cycle, two French monks came to Cordoba and brought the relics of 
some of the martyrs back to France, whereupon those relics began to perform large numbers 
of miracles – exactly the fulfillment of the outreach program toward which Eulogius had been 
working all along (pp. 52-54). 
Why, then, did the promotion of a martyr cult become a successful enterprise exactly 
at that point in time? By the middle of the ninth century the Muslim court in Cordoba had 
become a social, economic and political attractor. Increasing numbers of Christian men were 
working with or under Muslims, learning Arabic and neglecting Latin Christian letters, 
“passing” for Muslims while keeping their Christian practice hidden, taking halfway steps to 
please the Muslim court such as circumcision, and even undergoing full conversion to Islam. 
This was threatening the collective identity of local Christian society in a way that had never 
happened before, when following the Muslim conquest conversions were few, and would 
never happen again thereafter, as conversion progressed too far and the battle was hopeless. 
16By their provocation on the Muslim establishment, Eulogius and his associates were targeting 
not really the Muslims but the moderate Christians who were willing to seek accommodation 
and compromise with Muslim rule, disguise or minimize their religion, and thereby “sell out” 
their principles. In this sense, the authorities’ backlash against Christians at large was not 
collateral damage but the movement’s prime goal: to show in practice that when Christian life 
was taken seriously, the middle ground vanished and life under Muslim rule was intolerable 
(Coope, 1995, pp. 7-11). In other words, Eulogius’s stand was what in Reformation Europe 
would have been called an anti-Nicodemite stand. Relatedly, the radicals’ position was 
strongly reminiscent of Donatism in Roman North Africa (pp. 62-63). Therefore, the 850’s 
were a critical point in time when a radical group, building on the heroic tradition of early 
Christianity, could find it both necessary and still possible to try and persuade fellow 
Christians to stop associating with Muslims and thereby turn back or at least slow down the 
clock. In the long term the radical movement proved irrelevant to the conversion and 
assimilation process, but it did secure a martyr cult; remarkably, this “cult” was taken out of 
church by modern Spanish historical scholarship, which has hailed Eulogius and his group as 
the forerunners of Spanish nationalism (Coope, 1995, pp. XI-XII). Not bad for an ordinary 
priest working in a backwater of Christianity.
4.3. Conflicting martyrdoms in post-Reformation Europe
A uniquely interesting case study is provided by religious conflict in Europe in the 
century following the Reformation. Here we see three mutually exclusive martyrdom 
traditions developing alongside each other, all appealing to the same scriptural sources, and 
each claiming as own martyrs the victims of another’s persecution. All three traditions – 
Protestant, Anabaptist, and Catholic – took down the words and deeds of their saints in 
elaborate martyrologies and promoted a thriving martyr cult. Of course each group denounced 
the others’ as “false” martyrs, but repeated attempts on all sides at finding behavioral criteria 
to tell true martyrs from false failed: each group had to recognize that the others’ were as 
capable of steadfast suffering and dying as its own, so that all groups eventually agreed on 
Augustine’s dictum that “not the punishment, but the cause, makes a martyr”. This has led the 
leading scholar of the subject, Gregory (1999), to take seriously the victims’ own words and 
argue that they self-consciously died because of their faith, to bear witness to the Lord’s word 
as they understood it in the face of persecution. While this is a healthy counterweight to 
allegations of benighted fanaticism that seem to be popular in the relevant historical literature, 
17Gregory himself recognizes that: “Thousands of people endured death (…..) but many more 
dissembled their convictions, and literally millions  (…..) more or less conformed to religious 
changes without significant incident. (…..) Taken seriously, Christian faith made one a 
candidate for martyrdom, but it did not guarantee steadfastness. (…..) Many people believed 
deeply, moved in the same circles as martyrs, and professed their complete steadfastness, yet 
recanted rather than face torture or death. Their capitulations baffled and dismayed fellow 
believers. (…..) Profound religious faith therefore accounts for martyrdom, but it is not 
retrospectively predictive of actual martyrs” (pp. 110-111). To an economist, this means that 
faith was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for actual martyrdom. I will now argue 
that the strength of the martyrs’ cult provides the sufficient condition.
First, as with the ancient Roman Christians, flight or exile was an acceptable 
alternative to martyrdom, supported by Scripture (Matthew 10: 23) and accepted by 
controversialist writers from all groups (p. 103). Furthermore, the “anti-Nicodemite” 
imperative (never dissemble your faith or compromise your witness) was not without its 
critics, both among Protestants and Catholics (pp. 154, 262-263). Second, for a variety of 
reasons, local magistrates and inquisitors often did not carry out the laws mandating 
executions of heretics, and even more often were willing to release heretics who recanted 
regardless of what the law said. Prosecution was overwhelmingly bent on reclaiming lost 
souls, not slaughtering them; judicial records, where available, show that only a small 
percentage of the accused, even of those who refused to recant, were actually executed (pp. 
78-81, 90-96). This implies that apprehension did not automatically imply death and that a 
given prisoner’s actual fate did not reveal his or her behavior unambiguously. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, there is a subtle point about the theology of martyrdom that may 
undermine any straightforward correlation between strength of faith and steadfastness in the 
face of death. Of all willing believers, actual martyrs were chosen by God as a gift of grace 
and their perseverance came not from self-reliance and self-control but from total reliance on 
God’s help to overcome fear; as one Anabaptist wrote before dying, Christ had sent him the 
experience of terror in prison “so that I would not boast of myself, but that I would rely on the 
Lord alone and not on my strength” (p. 133). Since God chose and provided the necessary 
help to the chosen, it follows that as the apostle Paul said (1 Cor. 10: 13), God would not let 
one be tempted beyond one’s ability; and this was perfectly credible to those concerned since 
God would never mislead those from whom he demanded so much (pp. 131-132). But if so, 
then clearly it was possible to exculpate oneself before one’s conscience: if one was tested but 
18failed to endure and recanted, it must be because one was not chosen nor helped by God, and 
this in turn must be because the trial was beyond one’s strength. 
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that there was nothing either in the 
environmental constraints or the inner drive of a believer that dictated actual death. If so, then 
we are left with the martyrs’ cult as an incentive for some, though not all, of the persecuted to 
become martyrs; and since the organization and strength of the cult differed across religious 
groups, we should expect to see some difference in results. And indeed we do. The Catholics 
could draw on a time-tested organization of the cult, still very alive although there had been 
almost no new martyrs since the Roman Empire. The doctrine of penance and Purgatory 
developed during the Middle Ages made now possible even for apostates to repent, cleanse 
their soul and be spared hell, something the early Christians had never taken for granted; other 
things equal, this should have encouraged defection. On the other hand, the Catholics could 
avail themselves of a unique additional incentive: unlike the other groups’, their martyrs not 
only were remembered and loved by survivors but were also believed to perform intercession 
with God on behalf of supplicants and work miracles to their benefit. In the event, most 
European Catholics were safe, while persecution struck them only in the Netherlands – and 
there only against priests – and in England – and there only for open defiance of Elizabethan 
laws; those most at risk were the self-selected elite of English seminarians and Jesuits who 
voluntarily went to missionize in England in the same way as they did in the overseas 
missions (p. 297). So for these relatively localized, small numbers (some 430 people, as 
against some 4400 Protestants and Anabaptists combined, p. 6) the incentives proved just 
sufficient. 
The Protestants, and especially the Calvinists who had a particularly stern doctrine and 
were hard-tested in France and elsewhere, wrestled with more problems. They of course 
would not hear of intercession and miracles or the cult of relics, but on the other hand they 
could not get away with defection through penance in the way the Catholics could. Under the 
doctrine of predestination, steadfast behavior in the face of death might have been promoted 
and understood as a sign of election by God – a typically unverifiable quality (p. 162); yet as 
we have seen, the theology of grace from, and reliance on, God when confronting death made 
this incentive less than binding. All told, the clearest indication that incentives were hardly 
sufficient to sustain martyrdom on the scale the movement would have required is the 
massive, long-lasting barrage of anti-Nicodemite writings, first and foremost by John Calvin 
himself, apparently far more intense than in the other groups (pp. 154-155). 
19Like the Protestants, the Anabaptists too would have none of the miracles and 
intercessions nor would they allow themselves the benefit of penance. It is clear that large 
numbers recanted (pp. 80, 208), yet they managed to account for more than half of the 
roughly 4,400 non-Catholic martyrs of the period (Monter, 1996, p. 49) – a remarkable, if 
grim, record for a single group confined exclusively within the German- and Dutch-speaking 
lands. The proximate reason for this is that they very early renounced any attempt at political 
influence and withdrew into complete separation, thereby forsaking any possibility of political 
protection and becoming targets for persecution by both Catholics and Protestants of all 
stripes. So there was no safe haven for the Anabaptists and their numbers remained small, but 
the obverse side of this was a source of great strength: alone among all groups, they suffered 
but never killed, like Christ himself and the early Christians before them. This unique status 
of non-victimizing victims enhanced their claim to truth and righteousness in their own eyes, 
thereby reinforcing group cohesion and endurance. Remarkably, the legacy of their martyrs 
outlived the seventeenth century and their cult has been kept alive in the Anabaptists’ North 
American offshoots to this day (p. 249).
To cap this discussion with an extraordinary example, consider the case of John Frith, 
an early Lutheran and Cambridge-trained theologian who was burned in England in 1533. In a 
treatise he wrote while awaiting execution, he explained: “The cause of my death is this, (…..) 
because I cannot in conscience abjure and swear, that our prelates’ opinion of the sacrament 
(that is that the substance of bread and wine is verily changed into the flesh and blood of our 
savior Jesus Christ) is an undoubted article of the faith, necessary to be believed under pain of 
damnation” (cited in Gregory, 1999, p. 102). So this man was willing to die not for a specific 
belief he held about the Lord’ Supper, but for a lack of certainty about the Catholic doctrine 
about it (ie the doctrine of transubstantiation). Admittedly, the average martyr would have 
been considerably less educated and articulate than Frith. Still, he exemplifies well the point 
made in this section about a dignified, honorable survival in the memory of the living, in 
addition to a Christian faith, as key to the decision to accept martyrdom.
4.4. Back to the model
The discussion of Christian martyrdom in this section has pointed out several features 
that seem to strongly support the cult hypothesis. In each instance, death could be avoided 
without dissembling or reneging on the faith. In each instance, the observed willingness to be 
martyred strongly correlates with the strength of the cult: possibly the weakest cult for the 
20Calvinists, where widespread reneging was a persistent problem, a somewhat stronger one for 
the Anabaptists and the Catholics of early modern Europe, the strongest of all for the Spanish 
and Roman Christians. In these last instances, fanaticism, or voluntary martyrdom often at 
odds with church teachings, was very widespread: in the framework of the model, this 
occurred either because the cult grew beyond church control or even outside of the mainline 
church, or because groups of people featured “exhibitionist” preferences that disrupted the 
right-hand side of condition (6) above and hence made implementation of the martyrdom 
contract (5) impossible. 
In particular, the existence of excess martyrdom per se can be construed as strong 
evidence in favor of the cult theory. Suppose that in a religion an insufficient supply of 
martyrs obtains from the leadership’s point of view. This may be rationalized as defection in 
the framework of our model – for example because, despite the leadership’s efforts, the 
expected cult is in fact not intense and widespread enough to motivate compliance with the 
contract (the left-hand side of inequality (6) above is not satisfied). But it is still perfectly 
possible to argue that the would-be martyrs are indeed motivated by otherworldly 
expectations, but man is a weak creature, lured by worldly pleasures and afraid of suffering, 
so that not enough volunteers can be found to live up to the call. Therefore, insufficient 
martyrdom per se is no evidence in favor of the cult hypothesis.
The opposite case of contract failure, however, is different. Excess martyrdom from 
the church’s point of view, or fanaticism, cannot be so easily explained away by an urge for 
afterlife rewards. Granted, the faith was there, and church doctrine was not yet sharpened 
enough to disqualify the voluntary martyr from heaven by branding him a suicide. If we were 
dealing with some disconnected, solitary action, we could discount it as due to the odd zealot 
entertaining uncommon beliefs. But those involved in the Roman and Spanish movements 
were organized groups of people capable of consistent and sustained action though time, each 
action starting from the ongoing cult and feeding into it. In their words, the martyrs wanted to 
“join with Christ”, the archetypal martyr and model. But join in what? Surely not in heaven, 
since this could be achieved in other ways – join with Christ in the cult suggests itself as the 
most natural interpretation. The hereafter hypothesis simply does not seem able to account for 
organized, collective, long-lasting fanaticism, at least under Christianity. 
5. Summary and conclusions
21This paper has argued that when the decision to sacrifice one’s life for a (religious or 
secular) collective cause is taken under conditions that are not easily observed by third parties, 
such as the sponsoring organization, the individual’s behavior can rationally be explained by 
the pursuit of a worldly cult after death, making any appeal to otherworldly motivations – 
when ostensibly present – unnecessary. A simple principal-agent model shows that a contract 
that implements the organization’s preferences about martyrdom will in general exist, 
provided agents’ preferences are not too strongly at odds with the organization’s. 
Implementation of the contract requires the cult to be neither too strong nor too weak, because 
in the former case it will foster excessive sacrifice, or fanaticism, while in the latter case it 
will allow defection, or insufficient supply of volunteers. Hence to hold both fanatics and 
defectors in check, the organization must retain full control of the martyr cult, which is not 
always the case. 
To follow, a selective review of historical evidence has pointed out a whole range of 
cases that fit the broad features of the model, ranging from secular war heroes, through 
Islamic, Jewish and Christian martyrs, to revolutionary fighters and people who choose to die 
without killing. Then a close examination of the particulars of Christian martyrdom, 
beginning with Jesus himself and following with the Roman martyrs, the Spanish martyrs, 
and the three conflicting strands of martyrdom in Reformation Europe, has found strong 
support for the cult hypothesis in preference to the hereafter hypothesis as a basis for 
explanation of observed behavior. In particular, the evidence of excess martyrdom or 
fanaticism in both Muslim Spain and the Roman Empire has been argued to strongly speak 
for the cult theory.
If we were to draw policy implications for the way of dealing with suicide terrorists – 
the type of martyr that makes headlines today – the suggestion arising from the model in this 
paper is clear enough: do not waste any effort hunting down potential volunteers but knock 
down the cult, heaping shame or ridicule on the martyr and turning people’s attention and 
devotion away from it and towards less deadly acts.
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